|
|
|
|
Developing an Anti-TerrorismSecurity PlanBased
on HACCP* Principles
|
The September 11th tragedy left many Americans in fear of another wave of catastrophic terrorism. Rumors of the potential for terrorism with biological weapons fill the ears of city dwellers. Biological weapons are most often thought of as those agents designed to kill people, such as plague or smallpox. However, the use of livestock disease to create logistical and economic chaos predates the modern effort to harness the microbe as a tool for mass murder.
There are several reasons terrorists might resort
to anti-livestock biological weapons to accomplish their goals. Agricultural
pathogens are relatively easy to obtain and disseminate. A successful
attack does not need to infect thousands of animals. Many pathogens can
spread aggressively from farm to farm, so a small-scale attack on a few
farms could balloon into an epidemic spread by the wind or by the movement
of animals and equipment.
The economic implications of a successful attack can be large and swift.
To prevent the spread of disease, infrastructure is in place to severely
curtail movement of diseased agricultural products from country to country
or from region to region within our own country. As a result, farms with
infected livestock (or other agricultural products) lose both export and
domestic sales. Add to that the associated losses in the related industries
of storage, transport, processing, and sales of agricultural products,
and even a small-scale natural or intentional outbreak of agricultural
disease becomes extremely costly.
Acquiring and working with livestock pathogens does not require technical sophistication. If technically unsophisticated terrorists acquire these weapons, they will most likely try to disseminate them via crude and simple methods. Fortunately, equally simple and low-cost measures can be taken to reduce the likelihood that an attack will turn into an epidemic. And many of these steps have the additional benefit of reducing the extent and severity of naturally occurring disease outbreaks.
Large initial disease outbreaks increase the likelihood of the disease spreading to other farms due to the enormous amount of infectious agent produced when many animals are infected. To infect the largest number of animals at once, a terrorist may try to contaminate products, such as feed, that are distributed widely to the whole herd. In fact, a chemical attack on diary cattle was executed by poisoning the feed supply of the herd, leading to the destruction of the entire herd. To prevent such attacks from occurring, farmers should lock or put tamper-evident seals on bins that hold products that are distributed widely to the herd. Although these measures will not prevent these goods from being tampered with, they will inform the farmer that the goods should not be distributed to their animals.
Actions such as bin locks and seals are inexpensive and do not interfere with normal operations, so it doesn’t hurt to implement these measures. Ideally, any measure taken to thwart the effects of a relatively unlikely occurrence of terrorism should also help stop the spread of natural, virtually inevitable livestock disease outbreaks. Certain precautionary steps can and should be taken that will make the intentional introduction of disease to livestock more difficult and also help prevent the catastrophic spread of natural outbreaks of disease.
One such measure is to increase biosecurity at auction and sale barns. In an exercise conducted by the United States during the Cold War, agents acting as potential customers infiltrated auction and sale barns and pretended to infect livestock by spraying animals with spray bottles that contained water (to simulate a solution of virus) or dropping handkerchiefs (to simulate a pathogen-soaked rag) into a livestock pen. Both of these methods would be highly effective in spreading diseases such as foot and mouth disease (which can remain infective in cloth for at least a month). To prevent such an attack, owners of auction and sale barns should prevent as much direct contact as possible between people and animals. Simply searching visitors is not sufficient because many livestock diseases can be effectively transported on their clothing or hands and spread by rubbing a contaminated sleeve on a target animal. Animals could be separated from people by a double fence or other barrier. These measures will also help prevent the accidental spread of disease by visitors from a farm with an undiagnosed outbreak.
A terrorist could infect a herd by bringing a diseased animal into proximity with animals from other farms. Animals from different farms should be kept separate in auction and sale barns. Furthermore, animals should be inspected for disease symptoms before they are unloaded at an auction site. Because any animal that was in an auction/sale barn has been in contact with equipment touched by animals from other farms, such as the walls and floors of entryways, these animals should be quarantined until it is clear that they are uninfected. Farmhands that visit other farms should be instructed to change clothing and wash their hands before returning to work on their ranch. Foot baths should be employed for sanitation. Trucks that transport animals from more than one farm should always be washed before transporting a new shipment of animals. These measures will help prevent the spread of natural disease from farm to farm and reduce the number of animals infected if the disease does spread.
To prevent spread of a disease throughout a large farm or ranch, delineate artificial zones to divide the facility. The zones should be treated as separate farms and animals in each zone should be considered as originating from other farms. Therefore, animals and inexpensive equipment should not be moved between these zones and workers should tend animals only in their zone. Expensive equipment that must for economic reasons be used throughout the operation should be sanitized before moving to another zone. Likewise, essential personnel moving between zones should wash and change clothing. These measures will help limit the spread of any accidentally or intentionally introduced disease to a subsection of the herd, thereby reducing the amount of pathogen produced and reducing the chance that the disease will spread to other farms.
Alert farmers are the first line of defense against the spread of agricultural disease. Farmers should get to know the symptoms of the most economically important diseases that affect their livestock and train their key employees to recognize them as well. Information about these diseases can be found at the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service Web site (http://www.aphis.usda. gov/oa/pubs/factsheets.html). Herds should be inspected regularly; if any animal shows disease symptoms, that animal should be isolated. A veterinarian should be called immediately to confirm the presence of the disease. Carcasses of animals that have died after a sudden illness should be sent to the appropriate laboratory. It is vitally important that the proper animal health authorities be notified as soon as possible in each of these situations (see "Biosecurity Resources" at end of next article).
A farmer may hesitate to call animal health officials for fear his entire herd will be quarantined, but a quick response will eventually benefit everyone. The U.S. government reimburses farmers for animals destroyed to prevent the spread of disease. The longer diseased animals live, the greater the chance the disease will spread to other animals on a farm and in other farms. The more farms the disease spreads to, the longer the epidemic will last and greater the losses.
Implementing enhanced biosecurity measures and being
vigilant about signs of disease will not prevent a terrorist attack on
livestock, but these actions will significantly reduce the damage of any
such attack by limiting the extent of the outbreak. Even if an intentional
infection of livestock never occurs, these measures will limit the spread
of inevitable, natural outbreaks of disease.
Dr. Rocco Casagrande (rocco@papo-griffin.com)
is a biochemist who studies biological weapon defense. He is the founder
of PAPO-Griffin Consulting, a firm that helps companies and farmers prepare
for biological attacks on agriculture.
The terrorist attacks on our nation have brought many issues into open public discussion. Among the topics now being discussed is bioterrorism. Bioterrorism is, essentially, the use of biological materials such as pathogens or disease-causing agents for terrorist purposes. What many Americans don’t realize is that bioterrorism is not a new topic. What has changed is that now the word is being used everywhere from legislative chambers to boardrooms to coffee shops to living rooms.
I’ve been at work as the Bioterrorism Surveillance Coordinator with the Spokane Regional Health District for two years. My position, funded by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), came about as the result of national legislation enacted in 1999. Under this legislation, CDC was assigned a role in the surveillance, assessment, and tactical response to biological terrorist attacks. Washington State has three Bioterrorism Surveillance Coordinators, Byron Byrne, Julie Wicklund, and myself. With funding of about $5.5 million over five years, we work on bioterrorism response planning.
Washington State bioterrorism preparedness activities include dissemination of information, working with medical labs, and enhancing the security and delivery mechanisms of public health computer systems. We need to have the expertise and ability to respond to the standard bioterrorism weapons (e.g., Bacillus anthracis or anthrax, Yersinia pestis or plague, Franciscella tularensis or rabbit fever, Botulinus toxin or botulism, and Variola major or smallpox) as well as the range of other pathogens (e.g., enteric illnesses including E. coli 0157 and Salmonella) that could be used to attack the human population.
Of the five biological agents listed above as “standard bioterrorism weapons,” the first three (anthrax, plague, and rabbit fever) are zoonotics. This means they are diseases of animals that can be transmitted to humans. Because of this connection, my office works with the Spokane County veterinary disaster coordinator. Almost every county in Washington State has a volunteer coordinator who acts as a liaison to the Washington State Department of Agriculture (WSDA) in the event of a disaster involving livestock or pet animals. If an agricultural producer in Washington presents an animal infected with one of several dozen specific diseases to her veterinarian, that veterinarian contacts the veterinary disaster coordinator immediately, who in turn contacts WSDA. I get involved in cases where zoonotic disease is present that might affect the human population.
It is theoretically possible for a terrorist element to introduce infections to an animal population. Such an outbreak could impact humans via secondary infections or via animal mortality affecting meat or dairy production and the food supply. The best way to guard against animal infections reaching the human population is to maintain your animals’ good health, monitor your herd for changes that could indicate illness, and bring suspect animals to the attention of your veterinarian.
In an effort to increase awareness of epizootics and other veterinary diseases of grave concern, I recently worked with WSDA and the Washington State Department of Health (DOH) to put together a poster for veterinarians in Washington. This poster lists the various emergency diseases requiring immediate and next-day reporting to WSDA or the Department of Fish and Wildlife along with contact information. The information was adapted from the WSDA Animal Handbook for Veterinarians published January 2000 and combined with the latest state laws regarding such reporting. The posters will soon be available through DOH at (877) 539-4344. (For more information about biosecurity with respect to livestock, see “Biosecurity Resources” at the end of this article. See also previous article, “Terrorism on the Hoof: Livestock as a Bioterrorism Target.”)
We in the public health arena
must consider the food chain all the way from the stockyard through processing
and distribution to the family dinner table. There are many opportunities
for the safety of the food production cycle to be breached. (See “Terrorists
at the Table, Parts I and II, above.)
We encourage food processors to limit access to their production, storage,
and packing areas. This can be as simple as installing locks and rerouting
routine traffic. Within the production process itself, routine testing
for pathogens is good, but randomized routine testing is better. If, for
example, a meat processing facility always tests their product once at
the carcass stage then again just before the chunks of meat go into the
grinder, this pattern presents an opportunity for someone with malicious
intent. When testing is routine, all points after the testing become potential
security breaches. In this example, someone could inoculate the ground
meat with an infectious disease at any point after the grinding process
without fear of detection. Randomized safety checkpoints would increase
the fear of detection, perhaps decreasing the likelihood of sabotage.
On the home front, standard food safety practices are still the best safeguard against disease. Cook your food to the proper recommended internal temperature and wash or peel uncooked items before eating.
While much of my work is in the arena of education, communication, and strategic surveillance directed toward preventing bioterrorist attacks, we are also prepared to respond to incidents should they occur.
Since many deadly pathogens cause initial symptoms similar to the flu, it is important that everyone from emergency medical technicians to health district staff be educated in distinguishing the symptoms specific to the most likely bioterrorism agents. I have prepared information flyers for my county detailing many of the salient facts. Should an infection escalate among the population, we have strategies in place that will allow us to intervene and prevent a higher death toll. Such strategies could include working with local authorities to affect quarantines, bringing in appropriate pharmaceuticals, and initiating decontamination procedures.
In the final analysis, we are
all soldiers in the war on terrorism. Each of us is responsible for his
or her own sphere of influence. The dangers are not new. People like me
in the public health arena have known about bioterrorism for a long time.
People in agriculture and food production have, too. Now we all need to
do our part to lock up, restrict access, clean up, and make our homes,
businesses, and communities as safe as we can.
Bill Edstrom is the Bioterrorism Surveillance Coordinator with the Spokane Regional Health District. The office can be reached at (509) 324-1500 or (888) 535-0597, and Bill can be reached by e-mail at wedstrom@spokanecounty.org.
Biosecurity ResourcesState Veterinarian,
Idaho
|
By the time this article goes to press, we would hope that everyone involved in the application, sale, and distribution of pesticides would understand that we all play a role in safeguarding the public from the toxic chemicals with which we work. Agrichemicals are powerful allies in producing the food we put on our tables. Those of us who work with these agents respect their properties. That’s why pesticide manufacturing, distribution, and application are highly regulated activities, and why this newsletter devotes many pages of each monthly issue to evaluation and discussion of pesticide safety.
We in the agrichemical industries understand the importance of registration, licensing, and proper handling and storage of pesticides and other agrichemicals. We know we must work together, sharing information and resources to keep our industry a safe one. In the weeks following the terrorist attacks on America, there has been even greater spirit of cooperation within our ranks. Extension bulletins, e-mails, listserves, and other communications from professional organizations, regulators, and individuals have provided a wealth of information about pesticide safety. These materials have provided useful perspectives on the roles that we play in the big picture of safeguarding our families, our employees, and our nation, and have also engendered a sense of community among those in the industry.
The bottom line is that we need to do everything in our power to keep the toxic, flammable, and otherwise potentially dangerous chemicals we use out of the hands of those who might wish to use them as agents of harm. This means securing pesticides (and other potentially dangerous chemicals) and application equipment. If you are a grower or other applicator, try to purchase and store only those supplies you need for the season, to avoid unnecessary stockpiling. Should you have pesticides leftover at the end of the season, dispose of them properly (if you need guidance, contact your state’s department of agriculture).
Pay attention to the personnel in and around your place of business. Know your employees and the others who have access to your facility. Restrict access to areas where chemicals and application equipment are stored, and keep an accurate, up-to-date inventory of your stock on hand.
Pesticide dealers and distributors need to follow these basic precautions and more. Make sure to check the pesticide license information of those purchasing pesticides, making sure they are authorized.
A checklist of safe practices is provided at the end of this article. Most items are common sense, and many are reminders of things we have learned during our licensing training. But over time, we may have become careless or complacent in our routines. Now is a good time to reevaluate our security practices.
Securing toxic chemicals is obviously important. But some of us don’t work directly with chemicals; we work with information. What role can we play? Late last month, one of our Washington State University (WSU) information specialists had an opportunity to think about that.
The specialist received an e-mail inquiry about long-term storage of a pesticide in two-liter soft-drink-type bottles. The particular pesticide mentioned was one she knew to be highly toxic. The e-mail was not signed and came from a “Hotmail” address (a free Internet e-mail service available to anyone).
Following normal protocol, the specialist informed the inquiring party about the importance of storing pesticides in their original containers or obtaining information on alternative storage directly from the manufacturer. Pressing for more information, but still without identification or signature, the inquirer e-mailed a second time. The nature of the inquiries and of the specific pesticide caused the specialist to forward the e-mail to the authorities.
Did this specialist’s action prevent someone with a terrorist agenda from gaining information? We will probably never know. But we believe it was prudent and responsible given today’s climate and our responsibilities as pesticide stewards. The fact is that if someone wanted to use a pesticide as a weapon, that person might very well contact one of us—a researcher, an extension agent, a regulatory employee, a chemical distributor—for information.
How can we tell an innocent inquiry from one with ill intent? You can’t always judge a book by its cover. While some sources say that inquiries from local parties are generally trustworthy, statistics say terrorist groups in the immediate region can pose the greatest threat. Sometimes directing pertinent questions back to the inquirer or simply engaging the individual in conversation can help clarify the situation. Ask about the crop or usage site or about the timing of the application. Discuss equipment. Are they forthcoming about their operation and their needs? Are they just a little too persistent in their pursuit of information? If the inquiry is so odd as to merit reporting it to the authorities, gain as much information as you can about the caller. We have discussed this situation with law enforcement personnel and regulatory authorities on the local, state, and national levels, and all agree that it makes far more sense to be overly vigilant than to ignore suspicious activity. A partial list of contact numbers can be found below in this newsletter.
Of course, it’s easy to point fingers at others after the fact. Some of us, after hearing the news reports about the aerial applicator mechanic in Florida who had apparently been visited and queried by individuals with terrorist intent, disparaged the mechanic for not seeing the danger in the situation. But would we have reacted any differently had we been in his situation? The time has come to be vigilant, not out of fear, but out of respect for our responsibilities. The e-mail exchange described above is an example of a suspicious activity that any one of us might have brushed off six months ago, yet today we believe that such an inquiry bears investigation. We hope that anyone in a similar situation would react in the same way.
Examples of other suspicious behaviors (adapted from the resources listed at the end of this article) might include someone engaging in any of the following behaviors:
Let your instincts, training, and good sense be your guide when it comes to deailing with the public. And please keep these basic responsibilities in mind:
Secure agrichemicals and application equipment.
Stay alert.
Report suspicious and inappropriate activities to the authorities.
Carol Ramsay coordinates pesticide applicator education activities in Washington State. Her office is on the Pullman campus of WSU and she can be reached at (509) 335-9222 or ramsay@wsu.edu. Dr. Catherine Daniels is the manager of the Pesticide Information Center on the Tri-Cities campus of WSU. She can be reached at cdaniels@tricity.wsu.edu or (509) 372-7495.
Checklist
for Responsible Pesticide Ownership and Storage
|
Idaho State Department
of Agriculture, Pesticide Security, Special Issue, Oct. 5, 2001. http://www.agri.state.id.us/PDF/Ag%20Resources/Updates%2010-4-2001.pdf.
U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency, Chemical Accident Prevention: Site Security, Feb. 2000,
http://www.epa.gov/swercepp/p-small.htm#alerts.
For questions about this Safety Alert, contact George Hull at (202) 564-9469.
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Office of Prevention, Pesticides and Toxic Substances, Dennis Deziel, (202) 260-2913.
U.S. Department of
Transportation, Emergency Response Guidebook,
http://hazmat.dot.gov/gydebook.htm.
U.S. Department of
Transportation, Safety Alert Bulletin, Hazmat Transportation Community
Urged to Increase Safety Measures, http://hazmat.dot.gov/pubtrain/safe9-01.pdf.
Washington State
Department of Agriculture, Pesticide Management: Storage, http://www.wa.gov/agr/pmd/pesticides/storage.htm.
Washington State Emergency Management Division, Home Page, http://www.wa.gov/wsem.
Perhaps you didn’t have
any close friends or relatives in New York, Washington D.C., or Pennsylvania
on September 11, 2001. Perhaps you knew no one on American Airlines flights
77 or 11 or United Airlines flights 93 or 175. Perhaps, like many of us,
you were able to hold the horror at arm’s length and take President
Bush’s advice to “get on with business,” resuming your
normal work and personal activities as fully and as quickly as possible.
Then came the ban on crop dusting. Those of us in the agricultural community
could no longer pretend we weren’t affected.
How did aerial applicators become involved in anti-terrorist efforts? (ED. NOTE: While those of us in the industry know the correct, and more accurate, term is “aerial applicators,” the media continues referring to these aircraft and the individuals who operate them as “crop dusters,” regardless of the fact that precious little “dust” of any type is used in modern aerial crop protection.)
In the immediate aftermath of the September 11 terrorist attacks, ALL civilian aircraft were prohibited from flying. This included passenger airlines, recreational aircraft, air cargo transporters, and any other airborne craft. On Friday, September 14, agricultural aircraft were released to resume operations. In response to Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI)s information that a suspected terrorist had been arrested on an immigration violation in August and that he possessed information pertaining to agricultural aircraft, aerial applicators were grounded again on Sunday, September 16. This precautionary measure was suspended and agricultural aircraft were allowed to resume operations on Monday, September 17. Certain restrictions were put in place that kept agricultural aircraft clear of metropolitan zones.
In the week that followed, the potential for crop dusters to act as weapons was examined from every conceivable angle. Could such aircraft disperse toxins? Biological weapons? A senior terrorism official from Washington, D.C. was quoted as saying, “a crop-duster would provide a crude but deadly delivery system” for such agents. A subsequent two-day precautionary grounding took place Monday and Tuesday, September 24 and 25. The flight suspensions and restrictions originate as suggestions from the FBI to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), which in turn passes regulations down to the various aircraft associations, including the National Agricultural Aviation Association (NAAA), the organization representing aerial applicators. NAAA has cooperated fully with all FBI suggestions and FAA regulations. (See statement released by NAAA October 5, 2001, below.)
The Pacific Northwest produces an enormous variety of agricultural commodities. Our diverse selection of minor crops necessitates a range of protection strategies, including aerial application. Such a diversity of crops, climate zones, and cropping systems results in an aerial application industry that employs a wide variety of aircraft and application equipment.
According to Guy “Jock” Warren, Director of the Association of Washington Aerial Applicators, applicators in the Pacific Northwest fly “everything from the simplest piston-engine planes to more complex turbo-prop aircraft.” Even more diverse is the range of application equipment they use. Tank sizes, pumps, nozzles, and agitators vary from applicator to applicator and crop to crop.
A source who wished to remain anonymous told AENews that this diversity of equipment was sufficient to bewilder and thwart most would-be terrorists. In addition to the inherent difficulty of starting and flying many agricultural aircraft, this source felt that the customized application system employed by each applicator would be sufficiently unique to confound an unauthorized user.
Warren disagrees. While he admits that the stick-controlled (as opposed to yoke-controlled) configuration of virtually all Northwest applicator aircraft is far from standard among modern aircraft in general, it is not so unusual or complex that a mechanically inclined or resourceful individual could not figure it out. Most applicator aircraft are the style known as “tail-draggers” because they have a wheel under the tail and a high-nose, low-tail posture. Such aircraft were common in years past and are still flown in many parts of the world. Warren points out that the terrorists who planned and executed the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon knew how to do their homework. “They [the terrorists] have initiative and they have patience,” he cautioned.
Warren believes that we should not underestimate their intelligence and resourcefulness with respect to the alleged complexity of the instrumentation or application apparatus, either. While many applicator aircraft contain a great deal of customized equipment including radios, global positioning systems (GPS), and individualized application technology, these items are not beyond the grasp of an intelligent and determined individual.
With the aviation industry on high alert regarding unusual activities and inquiries, some aerial applicators argue that it would be difficult for an individual with suspicious motives to receive flight training. Given the flight simulators and other teaching aids widely available, a would-be pilot could probably acquire the necessary knowledge without attracting attention.
So, is the aerial application industry a “sitting duck” for terrorists? Hardly. But to understand the potential threat, we need to examine the possible ways an aircraft could be used to cause harm.
Dispersal of biological agents. It is theoretically possible that biological weapons (e.g., diseases) could be deployed by a crop duster. This theoretical possibility does not take into consideration the biological properties of the disease agents (Are they liquid or water-soluble? Can they live under application temperatures and conditions?). Most importantly, would this be an effective way to launch a biological attack? Would another method (another type of aircraft, another mode of transportation, or delivery through the food system) be more effective?
Aircraft as bomb. An applicator aircraft could be used as a suicide bomb. “When the concern arose,” said Jock Warren, referring to the FAA and NAAA contacts to Washington State aviators, “we were thinking about those 200, 300-gallon hoppers [chemical tanks on applicator aircraft], some up to 800 gallons.” Filling such a tank with an explosive could indeed affect an explosion. But, again, is this an effective terrorist weapon compared to the many alternative means of creating an explosive device?
Food contamination. Contamination of crops with the goal of impacting humans would be a very roundabout way of achieving a terrorist objective. While it is true that toxins could be applied to crops, most crops are processed or handled in a way that would minimize or destroy toxicity before it reached the consumer.
Crop sabotage. Disgruntled factions could wish to destroy crops by applying a desiccant or defoliator, either to attack an individual grower or to make a statement. This very real threat, known as eco-terrorism, is nothing new and, again, could be accomplished in ways other than by air.
Pesticides as weapons. Perhaps the most realistic concern for aerial applicators is that of the wrong individuals gaining access to the toxic pesticides they have on hand, as opposed to accessing their aircraft. Most experts believe pesticides that are highly toxic present a greater threat than biological weapons. (See related article, above.)
What can aerial applicators do to minimize the chance that their aircraft or their chemicals are used for the wrong reasons?
“I think we all need to be aware of securing” both planes and pesticides, says Warren. Most applicators with hangar access put their aircraft in a hangar, he says, but not everyone has that option. He encourages applicators to disable their aircraft, restrict access to it, or find another simple, practical way to inhibit its use by the wrong parties, such as parking a vehicle in front of it.
As for the agrichemicals themselves, everyone is in agreement that security is critical. Because of the licensing and training programs already in place, applicators know the gravity of mishandling toxic chemicals. Recent events serve as a reminder.
The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) agrees. An e-mail correspondence from Jeanne Heying at EPA’s Office of Pesticide Programs (OPP) dated September 21, 2001, directed to members of the American Association of Pesticide Safety Educators (AAPSE) suggested that pesticide educators and cooperative extension agents throughout the country consider re-emphasizing “SECURITY of pesticides, pesticide equipment, and related machinery” in all training and outreach information.
As for the FBI, at this writing they were content to allow the industry to continue to self-regulate, issuing this statement:
“Members of the agricultural aviation industry should continue to be vigilant to any suspicious activity relative to the use, training in or acquisition of dangerous chemicals or airborne application of same, including threats, unusual purchases, suspicious behavior by employees or customers, and unusual contacts with the public. Members should report any suspicious circumstances or information to local FBI offices.”
Your local law enforcement authorities (police or sheriff) may be able to assist you as well. FBI telephone numbers can be found under the Federal government listings in most telephone directories; several FBI numbers are provided in this newsletter. Callers are encouraged to obtain as many specific details about the suspicious activities and individuals as possible.
In the final analysis, aerial applicators in the Pacific Northwest are to be commended. In this time of general sacrifice and renewed patriotism, they rallied admirably, taking the concerns of their government and their neighbors seriously. In cooperating fully with FBI suggestions and FAA regulations, putting concern for national security ahead of their own livelihoods, they exhibited, as individuals and as an industry, a strength of character we can all admire.
Sally O’Neal Coates is an Editor of Research Publications at the Pesticide Information Center on the Tri-Cities branch campus of Washington State University. She is Editor of Agrichemical and Environmental News, now in its 30th year of publication. She can be reached at scoates@tricity.wsu.edu or (509) 372-PEST (7378).
|
NOTICE TO READERS:Beginning January 2002, Agrichemical and Environmental News will be available in electronic format only, on the Internet at URL http://aenews.wsu.edu. If you have been receiving a paper copy of this newsletter, you will need to log onto the Internet to read it. If you would like a FREE ELECTRONIC SUBSCRIPTION to AENews (a monthly e-mail notification when each month's new issue goes on-line), please send an e-mail to majordomo@tricity.wsu.edu, with body of message reading subscribe aenews_dist. Make sure nothing (not even a signature line) follows the subscribe message. To UNSUBSCRIBE, do the same thing with the message unsubscribe aenews_dist. |
Join the National
Pesticide Stewardship Alliance (NPSA) at the Memphis Downtown
Marriott from November 27 through November 30,
2001 for the second National Conference on Pesticide Stewardship. In addition
to presentations and interactive sessions on container recycling, pesticide
disposal, labeling, industry stewardship programs, and best management
practices, this year’s conference includes low-cost training classes,
a vendor show, a trip to the 3,000-acre Agri Center and a private evening
at Graceland. Applications for membership, registration, and other details
available at http://www.npsalliance.org/
.
Washington State University (WSU) provides
pre-license and recertification training for pesticide applicators. Pre-license
training provides information useful in taking the licensing exam.
Recertification
(continuing education) is one of two methods to maintain licensing.
(The other is retesting every five years.)
"Last Chance" Courses for 2001The last opportunity to obtain recertification credits in 2001 will be November 6-7 in Pasco (Spanish course available Nov. 7) November 19-20 in Lynnwood. |
Course registration (including study
materials) is $35 per day if postmarked 14 days prior to the first day
of the program you will be attending. Otherwise, registration is $50 per
day. These fees do not include Washington State Department of Agriculture
(WSDA) licence fees.
For WSDA testing sites, schedule, or other testing information, call 1-877-301-4555.
For more detailed information about WSU's pesticide applicator training, call the Pesticide Education Program at (509) 335-2830 or visit the Web site at
The Pesticide Notification Network (PNN) is operated by WSU's Pesticide Information Center for the Washington State Commission on Pesticide Registration. The system is designed to distribute pesticide registration and label change information to groups representing Washington's pesticide users. PNN notifications are now available on our web page. To review those sent out in the month two months prior to this issue's date, either access the PNN page via the Pesticide Information Center On-Line (PICOL) Main Page on URL http://picol.cahe.wsu.edu/ or directly via URL http://www.pnn.wsu.edu. We hope that this new electronic format will be useful. Please let us know what you think by submitting comments via e-mail to Jane Thomas at jmthomas@tricity.wsu.edu.
W.S.U. Pullman Home Page Comments and questions: cdaniels@tricity.wsu.edu Technical Assistance: scoates@tricity.wsu.edu Copyright © Washington State University / Disclaimer Electronic Publishing and Appropriate Use Policy University Information: 509/335-3564
